Sacked at Saipan

The relief of Major General Ralph Smith, United States Army, from the command of the 27th Infantry Division during the battle for Saipan on 24 June 1944 by Lieutenant General Holland M. Smith, United States Marine Corps, seemingly ignited a slow-burning fuse of service competition, jealousy, and animosity that some say is still burning bright today. If not for the sheer determination of the highest Army, Marine Corps, and Navy commanders in Washington, something so trivial, yet historic, as the relief of Ralph Smith could have hindered the strategic goals and operational objectives of the war against the Japanese. Nearly seventy years later, the question is still a topic of debate. Was Lieutenant General Holland Smith justified in relieving Major General Ralph Smith? Holland Smith's justifications centered on Ralph Smith's apparent disregard of orders and perceived inability to lead his division in combat. Historical appraisals of this relief have most often focused on either Army or Marine Corps doctrines in place at the time of the battle for Saipan. Instead of comparing and contrasting doctrines from the Second World War, this monograph appraises Lieutenant General Holland Smith's effectiveness as a corps level commander and the factors influencing his decision to relieve Major General Ralph Smith using today's doctrinal combat power assessment from the Army's Operations, FM 3-0 Change 1. As stated in this Army doctrinal publication, there are eight elements of combat power: mission command, movement and maneuver, fires, sustainment, intelligence, protection, information, and leadership. This monograph evaluates the justifications based on today's standards of combat power analysis, focusing on only three of the eight elements of combat power: military intelligence, mission command, and leadership. The flawed military intelligence assessment of the enemy's strengths and capabilities at two pieces of key terrain, the unclear operational orders in the midst of bat