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Continuous-Time Principal-Agent Problems under Partial Information

Name: Continuous-Time Principal-Agent Problems under Partial Information
Brand: VDM Verlag
SKU: 06843885
Price: 50.05 EUR
Availability: InStock
Author: Alessandra Mainini
ISBN: 9783639371741

Alessandra Mainini

Jazyk

Angličtina

Kniha Brožovaná

Libristo kód: 06843885

Nakladateľstvo VDM Verlag, august 2011

Moral hazard is a key issue in principal-agent literature. Examples lie in several aspects of real l... Celý popis

Libristo kód: 06843885

121 b

50.05 €

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Moral hazard is a key issue in principal-agent literature. Examples lie in several aspects of real life, such as the worker's lack of effort when his/her conduct cannot be directly observed by the employer, and the principal's consequent need to motivate the agent to work as much as possible in his/her best interests. Another example is the relationship between voters and politicians, where elections serve as a disciplining mechanism to prevent rent-seeking behavior by unobserved public administrators. In this work we analyze such problems in a continuous-time setting with a model specification that draws from the classical consumption/investment ŕ la Merton. Agents differ in competence, which is incompletely (but symmetrically) known by all players and learned over time by observing agent's performance. From a mathematical point of view, the analysis uses classical filtering techniques to re-formulate the problem within a complete information setting; then, relying on the dynamic programming principle and by using a guess-and-verify approach, explicit (at least to some extent) solutions are provided.